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In his editorial 'More on professional ethics' (1) Dr Gillon argues for three main theses, which are stated in his third paragraph: 1) that a doctor has a special professional obligation to benefit his patients medically; 2) that 'that obligation is at least in part altruistic in that it is self-imposed by the medical profession not to benefit themselves but to benefit their patients'; 3) that 'it is at least in part supererogatory in that it goes beyond what is required of every person and every occupation'. 1) No one would dispute, and certainly I did not dispute in my commentary on Mr Paul Sieghart (2), that doctors have special professional obligations to their patients which other people (non-doctors) do not have. But pilots have special obligations to their passengers and shopkeepers to their customers which other people not in these jobs do not have. In other words, to say that doctors have special obligations to their patients which non-doctors do not have is not to make a moral point at all but simply to define what it is to be a doctor.
2) The claim that the doctor's professional obligation to benefit his patients rather than himself constitutes the moral duty of altruism or benevolence is either trivially true or plain false. It is trivially true if all it means is that part of the job of the doctor is to benefit patientsfor, as we have seen, that is simply a job-description, just as it is trivially true that a pilot benefits his passengers by transporting them safely. The general point here is that society, with its division of labour, has grown up as a system of mutual benefit; we are members one of another. In other words, the vast majority of jobs are in some way for the benefit of others so it is not a significant claim to say that the role of the doctor exists for the benefit of others. The thesis is false ifit is taken as suggesting that doctors (or pilots) show the special moral virtue of altruism in benefiting their patients or passengers. Whatever they show it cannot be the moral virtue of altruism or benevolence since both doctors and pilots receive a high remuneration for so doing. To stress this point is not to join Mr Paul Sieghart in cynicism (3), but just to make Key words Professional ethics; doctor/patient relationship. the conceptual point that when a person carries out his well-paid employment (whatever it is) he cannot be called 'altruistic' or 'benevolent' for so doing. Now if the doctor were on holiday, attended to a stranger who had fallen ill, and did not ask for payment, then that would be benevolent. There is a myth left over from an earlier period that doctors do a lot of this unpaid work, but most commonly they would (perhaps rightly) simply advise ringing for the nearest ambulance or doctor on call. Sometimes of course doctors can and will help in such situations, and that is altruism. This is perhaps what Gillon means when he says that the doctor's moral duty exists independently of any financial considerations. But car mechanics also sometimes help when they are off duty, and then what they do must also count as altruistic.
Paul Sieghart would say that the difference is that we do not expect a mechanic to help but we do expect a professional to help, and I shall come to this sense of 'expect' shortly. Note here however that it would be only in an emergency that we would expect an off-duty doctor to help -we would not expect him, say, to advise on acne when he was off-duty -but in emergencies we might also expect off-duty mechanics, coastguards, policemen and many others to help. The point is that there is a moral duty on anyone to help in an emergency if he/she can, and if off-duty doctors or policemen are more likely to be called on than some others (philosophers or lawyers), it is because they have especially relevant skills, not because they have a special moral duty which the rest of us do not have.
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